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Goldsmith (1969) was the first who convincingly proved the existence of this1
relationship. All subsequent studies confirmed it (see for example King and Levine,
1993, and the review in: Pagano, 1993). Goldsmith used a sample of 35 countries for
the period between 1860 and 1963 to show the relationship between income and
financial depth measured by the ratio between bank's assets and GDP. He also showed
that in periods of rapid growth, financial depth grows faster than income. More details






Literature which examines the relationship between financial
development and economic growth raises more questions than it answers. Still, it
has no dilemmas regarding the existence of a positive correlation between financial
development and economic growth.  This empirical study also confirms this fact.1
Controversies arise over the factors that determine the strength of the relationship
between financial development and economic growth, and over the ways of shaping
government intervention, if any, in order to establish and reinforce the positive
relationship between financial development and economic growth. There are
various theoretical models which provide different answers to these questions.
This paper deals with the issues concerning the relationship
between financial development and economic growth which are important at this
moment of development of the Republic of Croatia. Some issues are not included
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Based on the data from Levine (1997), a range of different financial indicators was2
calculated for Croatia in 1997 using the same indicators applied in 1990 study for less
developed, moderately developed and highly developed countries. With an approximate
14 percent share of central bank assets in GDP, Croatia resembles a feature of a highly
developed country (as the average share of less developed and moderately developed
countries is around 30 percent). With the ratio of commercial bank assets in GDP
reaching 74 percent, Croatia is a typical moderately developed country (in 1990, highly
developed countries averaged 160 percent). However, since the ratio of market
capitalization of the Zagreb stock exchange in relation to GDP is 23.3 percent, and the
stock exchange transactions turnover in Zagreb and Varaždin Stock Exchanges reached
2 percent of GDP in 1997, Croatia belongs to the group of less developed countries. In
1996 income of the insurance sector reached about one third of the income of the
banking sector, while the assets of the former accounted for about 3 percent of GDP
or approximately 5 percent of the banking sector assets. Therefore, this paper will not
pay special attention to the analysis of the insurance sector.
here since their theoretical elaboration is insufficient, their empirical results are
questionable and they are of relatively small importance to our financial system.
This refers primarily to the role of new financial instruments, to non-banking
intermediaries, and to the role of equity market. We do not imply here that these
intermediaries are not important for Croatia, or that they will not have an
important role in the financial market in the near future. Actually, in the years to
come, their importance will grow faster than that of banking intermediaries, as
there is a rule which states that with higher level of economic development
non-banking intermediaries (insurance companies, investment funds, etc.) increase
their share in the financial service market. However, only in 5-10 years can we
expect these intermediaries to reach a significant portion of the current
intermediary role of the banking sector. At this moment, Croatia is a typical
moderately developed country when it comes to the intermediary role of the
banking sector, but as far as non-banking financial intermediaries are concerned,
it is still at the level of underdeveloped countries.2
The first part of this paper analyzes the relationship between
financial development and economic growth in a simple financial environment.
Money is the main form of savings, banks are the only financial intermediaries,
and the banking market, i.e. deposit and credit market, function perfectly. In the
second part of the work we introduce an assumption of imperfect functioning of
the market, which results in market failure. Here we analyze the relationship
between financial development and economic growth in a situation in which the
market failure reaches dimensions which cause a banking system crisis and
introduce the need for its constant control through government intervention. This
part deals with bank supervision and deposit insurance. The third part of the work
deals with institutional solutions which could help establish and reinforce a
positive correlation between financial development and economic growth in
Croatia.
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Keynes analyzed only the short-term effects, thus neglecting the role finance have in3
the long run. He subjected financial markets to government intervention, i.e. to the
government controlled aggregate demand. This approach resulted from his belief that
private financial markets, particularly the stock markets, are the destabilizing factor
of modern capitalism. (He used the term "animal spirit" to describe investment
activities in those markets). Therefore, it is not surprising that Keynes' followers
regarded the financial sector as secondary, emphasizing the primary relationship
between growth and "real" entrepreneurship (Robinson, 1952, p. 82, in Levine, 1997,
p. 688).
Boisguillbert, Becher alongside Quesnay are significant names of the school of4
physiocrats. Owing to the faith in the functioning of a free market (shared by all the
physiocrats), Boisguillbert drew on the same assumptions as Keynes did a century and
a half later, to reach completely different conclusions. According to Schumpeter (1975,
p.235), Boisuguillbert warned about the barriers that the government sets on
circulation of income: taxes, export customs, and regulatory intervention in agriculture
and industry.
2
SIMPLE MODELS WITH A PERFECTLY
FUNCTIONING BANKING MARKET
According to Schumpeter (1912; quoted in Levine, 1997)
economic growth was a product of interaction between financial and real
innovations. John Hicks (1969, quoted in Levine, 1997) held a similar view, stating
that finance played a crucial role in industrialization of the now developed
countries. However, research into dynamic forces that are active in the long run
was expelled from the mainstream economic thought during most of the 20th
century. This happened due to the influence of John Maynard Keynes, a theorist
of short-term fluctuations and crisis. According to Keynes, growth (or more
precisely, short-term cyclical boom in economic activity) was primarily a product
of a country's ability to maintain the interest rate at a level sufficiently low to
stimulate investment.3
Although every reduction of complex systems of ideas to their
main assumptions necessarily falls into a fallacy of superficiality, we can still say
that Keynes' view of the financial system was based on the so-called paradox of
thrift. Economists got to know this idea from Boisguillbert,  and Keynes4
reinterpreted it in the light of price rigidity: high interest rates attract savings, but
discourage investments; a decrease in investment lowers real income, and smaller
income means less savings; income decrease has a stronger effect than an increase
of interest rates, so eventually inventories are accumulated, the surplus of supply
is created, as well as deflationary pressure and recession, due to downward price
rigidity.
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Blanchard and Fischer (1992, p. 18) calculated the coefficient of linear correlation5
between the residual of ARIMA process for quarterly GDP and the same process for
interest rates (with US government bonds with a maturity of three months, which
most empirical studies take as the relevant interest rate). The current correlation is
positive (0,14), but not very far from zero. The correlation disappears after a quarter
(-0.01); reaches its maximum after two quarters (0.30); but starts decreasing again in
the third quarter (-0,14). Using a more recent technique of structural vector
auto-regression, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) found there was a short-term impact of
interest rates on unemployment, but in the long-term this impact disappeared. The
results are valid for the United States of America, and the short-term here refers to two
years. Therefore, the results of Bernanke and Blinder can be interpreted as a proof that
the monetary policy of the US is efficient in the short run. Friedman and Kuttner
(1992) obtained a similar result for interest rates measured by the spread between
interest rates on commercial bills and government bonds. However, all these results
are valid only for a large and closed economy, such as that of the USA.
In "Treatise on Money", Keynes clearly states that inflation is not desirable, as it can6
threaten to destroy the functions of money.
The recession scenario shown above assumes a closed economy
where gross investment equals national savings (simultaneous internal and external
equilibrium), money has no substitute, and the banking market functions perfectly.
The equilibrium interest rate ensures stationary equilibrium in the money and
credit markets. As money has no substitute, the accumulated reserves are "sterile",
i.e. they cannot perform any monetary function. However, if money had a
substitute, an increase in money interest rate would stimulate the use of alternative
quasi-monetary assets and recession could be avoided.
"Inside" money, i.e. the money created by the banking system
in the process of money-credit multiplication, would be an obvious substitute for
"outside" or reserve money. Furthermore, if inside money is considered as an
institutional innovation in the sense in which Schumpeter saw it, it can be viewed
as complementary in the process of capital accumulation. Actually, it can be
demonstrated that the Keynesian scenario need not occur if "inside" money is
present, i.e. if there is a developed banking system. The same situation can occur
in conditions where financial innovations (liberalization) allow for various
currencies in asset portfolio, including the quasi-monetary forms.
Besides the sensitivity to changes in theoretical assumptions
regarding money, the post-Keynesian theoretical innovations were encouraged by
the fact that it is not possible to conclusively prove a negative correlation between
the interest rate and GDP, especially in the long run . Therefore, Keynesian5
economists analyzed the monetary transmission mechanisms along other lines,
which Keynes would find unacceptable if judged by his "Treatise on Money".  They6
have come up with a result, today known as Tobin's effect (Tobin, 1965). It
maintains the assumption that money and physical capital are the only assets.
Reserve money is the only money. An exogenous increase in the money supply
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causes an increase in prices. The increase in prices increases the opportunity cost
of keeping the money, as well as the expected yield on investment. Thus, monetary
expansion stimulates substitution of money for physical assets. Investment
demand and income increase. In this way the transmission mechanism which
functions through nominal interest rates is substituted by a transmission
mechanism which functions through inflation. 
It is possible to see Tobin's effect functioning in two ways. In
literature, the first mechanism is known as "money rain": reserve money comes
from nowhere, as if employees of the central bank were throwing packages of cash
at people on the street. The second mechanism is fiscal intervention: the
government spends collected inflation tax on public investments.
Tobin's effect depends on a rapid substitution of money with
capital goods in the portfolio and on the assumption of a closed economy. If we
think of the real portfolio of money substitutes with a bit of more imagination, we
can no longer be certain about the result. If we assume that the portfolio contains
money substitutes denominated in foreign currency, inflation could stimulate the
demand for it (and a depreciation of the exchange rate), before influencing the
change in the demand for capital goods. The same effect can appear with the
opposite sign: deflation need not cause a decrease in demand for capital goods as
its effects will be depreciated by an increased supply of assets in foreign currency
(with an appreciation of the exchange rate). Therefore, with a richer portfolio and
opening up of the economy, the external sector and its related financial
instruments can absorb internal shocks thus annulling the Keynesian effect (or at
least making its explanation far more complex).
At this point of our analysis we will introduce inside money
created in the process of monetary-credit multiplication. According to Gale (1983),
this minor variation of assumptions can create the "anti-Tobin's effect". Namely,
a part of the money supply created in the process of multiplication is not created
through substitution of capital goods with money, but through an increased
demand for capital goods financed by bank credits. If we only observe new debtors
who have both money and capital goods in their portfolio, we might notice Tobin's
effect: inflation stimulates them to substitute their demand for money with
demand for capital goods. The old debtors, however, who borrowed money before
in order to invest in capital goods, now demand more money in order to pay back
their debts, so the substitution of money with capital goods need not appear on the
level of national economy.
The thesis regarding inside money, which is created as a
complement in the process of capital accumulation, and not as an asset substitute
of physical capital, is typical of the so-called "Stanford school of financial
development" (Gurley and Shaw, 1960). If viewed in that light, the role of interest
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Since the end of the 1970's, the relation between money and income has weakened7
(either because of change in the speed of money circulation, or other new money
substitutes - not included in the definition of money aggregates - have begun to
perform the functions of money). However, this does not imply that a Keynesian
mechanism of monetary transmission is not operational. The only difference is that the
role of money aggregates can be considered insignificant in comparison to a role of the
interest rate (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Friedman and Kuttner, 1992).
In the USA, Blanchard and Fischer (1992) found a weak and negative correlation8
between innovations of price level and GDP level, and a positive one, though weak,
when the variables are shown in the form of the first differentials of natural logarithms
(the innovation is residual, i.e. irregular component of the univariant time series
ARIMA model). The assumption that inflation can be viewed as an exogenous variable
whose manipulation can influence real output, has now been mostly rejected. Real
output and prices are two endogenous variables that react to exogenous shocks
rates can be contrary to the one it plays in the Keynesian models. One can imagine
how an increase of deposit interest rates could stimulate an inflow of bank deposits
(savings). If banks perform their role of financial intermediaries well, a positive
effect on savings, on investment and on growth will be seen. Furthermore,
McKinnon (1973) showed that a small variation of assumptions can confirm this
result even when there is no inside money. His model functions in the following
manner: the absence of inside money means that investments are financed from
internal company sources. Therefore, entrepreneurs have to accumulate outside
money before they start investing, hence the correlation between the growth of
physical capital and real money, which is present in conditions of high (real
deposit) interest rates. That is why McKinnon considered the relationship between
ratio of investments to GDP (I/Y) and real deposit interest rates to be bell-shaped
(Mihaljek, 1993, p. 730). He also emphasized that the optimal real deposit interest
rate can be even higher than the one with which the ratio of I/Y reaches its
maximum, if a variable of investment quality which grows simultaneously with
real deposit interest rate, is introduced into the model. On the other hand, low
interest rates and a high and variable inflation cause financial dis-intermediation
and recession. This effect is known as McKinnon's hypothesis of "financial
repression".
The models presented above assume a closed economy and
perfect functioning of the banking market. Therefore, there is no need for explicit
modeling of the financial intermediaries' market. Differences in results arise due
to differences in assumptions. In the Keynesian models money is a part of the
assets portfolio and has no close substitute. Entrepreneurs rely on external sources
of financing. The transmission mechanism of monetary policy works through:
monetary expansion - decrease in interest rates - growth of investment and
income ; or through: monetary expansion - growth of inflation - substitution of7
money demand for capital goods demand - growth of investment and income . The8
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simultaneously, and economists research various forms of these reactions through
structural vector auto-regression models. Gerlach and Smets (1995) used this
technique to compare monetary transmission mechanism in the G-7 countries. A
simulation of the influence of a 1 percent growth of nominal short-term interest rate
through a SVAR model has demonstrated the existence of a short-term impact on real
output (which ranged from the minimal -0,5 percent in Italy after 9-10 quarters of a
year, to the maximum of -1,5 percent in Germany and Japan after the same time
period), where each impact on the real output disappeared after 6-7 years in all of the
G-7 countries which the authors considered stable. However, the impact on deflation
turned out to be permanent, with certain countries even reaching inflation in the
initial short-term period. In Italy it lasted 6 quarters after interest rates had been
raised, 7 in France, and as many as 10 in the United Kingdom. Therefore, these results
show different movements of real GDP and prices, depending on the country observed
and the time interval that elapsed since the appearance of the exogenous shock. It is
possible that there is simultaneous appearance of inflation and a decrease of GDP, of
deflation and of a decrease of GDP, or of deflation and an increase of GDP, so there are
no indications of inflation and output being connected in any way through a simple
cause and effect relation.
functioning of these transmission mechanisms can be questioned if existence of a
greater number of various assets, including close money substitutes, is allowed, or
if one views money accumulation and capital goods accumulation as
complementary (Stanford school of financial development). This complementarity
can appear due to the correlation between creation of internal money and the
process of investment (Gale), or due to the need for money accumulation before
investment in the self-financing model (McKinnon).
2.1 Indirect investigation of the
transmission mechanism through
money demand functions
Before the appearance of structural vector auto-regression
models, which have only been used for the past five to six years, the proof of
functioning (or more correctly: of a possibility of functioning) of the Keynesian
transmission mechanism through interest rates, was searched for through
evaluation of money demand functions such as m = f(y,i), where m is real money,
y is real income, and i is nominal interest rate or some other measure of
opportunity cost of holding the money. If the existence of a statistically significant
elasticity of money demand with nominal interest rates could be demonstrated, it
would follow that nominal interest rate could be decreased with the intentional
creation of a money supply surplus. If this is included in a structural model of the
IS-LM type (with or without extensions for  the  external  sector),  where  the  IS
function which shows the negative relationship between investment and interest
214 CROATIAN ECONOMIC SURVEY1996 - 1999
If investments do not depend on the interest rate, the IS curve is vertical, so the9
movements of the LM curve have no effect on income, but are completely reflected in
the changes of the interest rate.
It can be noted that this is in accordance with theoretical elaboration. Let us just10
remember that the Keynesian effect becomes questionable when we allow for the
existence of a greater number of money substitutes in the assets portfolio, which is
exactly what happens in the processes of financial liberalization and financial
innovation.
rates  plays an important role, then a transmission through interest rates is possible9
if full employment is not present in the economy. Of course, this is just a
possibility.
The approach to transmission mechanism based on money
demand entirely neglects the structure, the level of development, and the way in
which financial markets function. The relationship between a financial system and
growth is viewed exclusively through price variations (the price of goods in Tobin's
model or the price of money in the original model) which can be stimulated
through government intervention. This type of approach directly follows the
assumption that the financial market functions perfectly, so in every moment there
is a unique and well defined interest rate which equalizes savings and investments.
During the 1960's, few functions of money demand were
estimated correctly. Estimates, such as the one shown here, by Meltzer (1963, p.
225), based on yearly data from 1900 to 1958 for USA, where W is wealth (w is the
real wealth), m is real money, i is the nominal interest rate, and t-tests are shown
in parenthesis below the actual parameters, were very rare. All these rare estimates
pointed to a possibility of functioning of the Keynesian mechanism of monetary
transmission. Having in mind the level of development of econometrics at the time
(the beginning of 1960's), there was little room for doubt:
(1)  ln m = -1.48 - 0.949 ln i + 1.11 ln w R =0.9922
                    (-21.8)         (42)
During the 1970's and 1980's, the old models of money demand began to
systematically show great forecasting errors for the stock of money in circulation
("the case of the missing money"), and the financial liberalization which widened
the range of financial assets in the portfolio began to cause problems because of the
role interest rate played in estimations . Dynamic models of money demand were10
developed which successfully solved a part of the evaluation problem in developed
countries (Filosa, 1995). At the same time, a large number of research into money
demand in developing countries appeared, which pointed to the instability of the
evaluation and to a small or non-existent role of nominal interest rate in the money
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It is very uncertain whether any government can allocate resources efficiently. Most11
economists believe that history has showed, judging by the experience of most
countries, that the answer is negative.
demand function (Anušiæ, Rohatinski and Šonje, 1995). This apparently confirms
the conclusion that proper functioning of the Keynesian transmission mechanism
requires a developed market of domestic public debt, a central bank which regulates
the money supply through open market operations and a certain level of limited
substitution between various forms of assets, as these conditions allow for more
significant variations of the interest rate, which can have an effect on the real
output. However, these assumptions (especially the first two) are not valid for most
developing countries.
A problem with the role of interest rates in developing countries
(explained by the lack of developed public debt market) arises due to the
domination of direct loans to the government by the central bank, i.e. due to the
transfer of substantial seigniorage of central banks, collected through inflation tax.
There is no good side to this, since such a system threatens with inflation and does
not allow for fine-tuning of money demand through open market operations.
It is important to note that this conclusion assumes a
correction of the quasi-Keynesian thinking shown through Tobin's effect. This
thinking is closer to Keynes' original thoughts which did not tolerate high inflation,
but was based on the important role of government's corrective role. It is noted here
that inflation and inflation tax prevent the development of public debt market,
without which transmission through interest rates becomes impossible. If there is
a developed government debt market, the government can issue debt, the central
bank can intervene through purchases in that market in order to prevent the
growth of interest rate (or encourage its fall), and the government can then finance
investments and stimulate growth with accumulated funds. This approach has a
built-in inflationary bias, but it does not need a central bank which would only take
care of price stability. The monetary authority needs to be either subordinated to
fiscal authority, or should have an especially adjusted objective which would take
care of unused capacities and buy government debt until an inflationary threat
arises. An "enlightened government" is also needed which refrains from the
placement of funds collected in this manner into consumption, and spends
seigniorage on investments. This will have a greater return in the long run than
alternative private investments (so that crowding out private investments in favor
of government investments, in the long run brings about net social benefit.) .11
Finally, we should also note that this approach assumes the public debt market to
be the main transmission mechanism of monetary policy, where the role of the
banking sector can be neglected.
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The evaluation refers to the period between January 1991 and October 1994.12
Partial adjustment model - PAM.13
Detailed results of the study have never been published and are thus included in the14
Appendix to this paper, in Table A2.
The value of the long-term parameter is obtained by dividing the short-term parameter15
by one minus the inertia parameter.
Can we come to a direct conclusion regarding the nature of the
functioning of the monetary transmission mechanism based on the behavior of the
money demand in Croatia? I believe that on the basis of the results known to us
so far, we can conclude that the Keynesian mechanism of monetary transmission
does not function in Croatia. In the first evaluation of the money demand function
in Croatia,  Anušiæ, Rohatinski and Šonje (1995) found an almost unitary income12
elasticity of money demand (0.98) and a very weak interest rate elasticity (-0.07)
which, although being somewhat greater than the typical interest rate elasticity in
developing countries, is still significantly smaller than the interest rate elasticity of
money demand in developed countries. According to their results, a demand for
real money demonstrates the greatest sensitivity to the monthly rate of inflation.
The sensitivity of money demand to inflation has been obtained
through the use of the same method  applied on the data for the period between13
March 1992 and March 1997 (Šonje, 1997) . This indicates a possibility of a14
permanent and stable influence of inflation. According to Anušiæ, Rohatinski and
Šonje (1995), the inflation parameter was -0.7589 while according to Šonje (1997)
the same parameter was - 0.7543 in the equation which included depreciation rate
as a ratio of opportunity cost of holding the money; or -0.8254 in the equation
which included interest rate as a ratio of opportunity cost of holding the money.
However, the results from the 1997 study and the results from the 1995 study
conducted by Anušiæ, Rohatinski and Šonje, had significantly different values for
other variables. In the 1997 study, the inertia parameter was smaller at 0.6883, or
0.6997 in the second equation, while Anušiæ, Rohatinski and Šonje found this
parameter to be 0.8857. Together with a greater short-term income elasticity (0.41
in the 1997 study compared to 0.112 found by Anušiæ, Rohatinski and Šonje), the
long-term income elasticity  from the 1997 evaluation was 1.31 in the first and15
1.37 in the second equation, while Anušiæ, Rohatinski and Šonje found it to be
0.98. However, when it comes to interest rates, there is an even greater difference
in the results. Interest rates became statistically significant only when they reached
the level of significance of 20 percent which is usually considered insignificant.
Furthermore, the mentioned 1997 study evaluated the nominal
partial adjustment model, in which the price level was explicitly included on the
right-hand side of the equation, as an explanatory variable. The results obtained
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Anušiæ, Rohatinski and Šonje (1995, p. 92-96).16
were interesting. The inertia parameter did not change when compared to the
evaluation of the real money model. The long-term price level parameter was very
close to one, proving the unitary price elasticity of demand for nominal money. The
income elasticity increased slightly, reaching a value of approximately 1.4. The
parameters of other variables decreased and lost some statistical significance: with
inflation in the first equation the parameter was -0.2088, while with the second
equation it was -0.1747. Interest rate and depreciation rate parameters were not
significant even at 20 percent level.
Therefore, inflation leads to demonetization (a decrease in real
money), which indirectly denies the possibility of transmission through Tobin's
effect, since it is difficult to imagine a longer period in which real money decreases
or stagnates, and investment and GDP rise. Due to the lack of a more significant
role of interest rates the transmission through interest rates is also uncertain. In the
case of Croatia, these facts can be explained if we look at how the public debt
market and the banking sector have been developing.
After 1993, there were two parallel processes in Croatia: the
process of consolidation of public finance and the process of rehabilitation of the
banking sector. Up to the beginning of the 1990's and in the first two years of war,
public and banking sectors did not have clearly differentiated functions. A weak tax
administration, a chaotic taxation system with too many tax rates differentiated
according to criteria which were not clear, together with high inflation, limited the
government's ability to collect funds for public spending and to stabilize the fiscal
system. The banking system served as an alternative source of financing for the
realization of the country's objectives. Since 1993, especially after the high inflation
was reduced, the fiscal function began to separate itself from the function of
banking intermediation. With the development of tax administration, significant
growth of economic activity and the resultant growth of the tax base, and due to
the Oliver-Tanzi effect , government revenues started to recover quickly,16
eliminating the need to use the banking system as a quasi-fiscal instrument.
Furthermore, in 1994, the country recorded a fiscal surplus which allowed for fiscal
financing of the rehabilitation of banks whose credit policies, during the years, were
not governed by economic criteria, thus accumulating large amounts of bad debts
on their balance sheets. In such conditions, the main goal of economic policy
creators was to decrease the dependence of banks on the government, which can
be seen in the ratio of the claims on the government in the total assets of the
banking system. At the end of 1993, as much as 42.2 percent of the total assets of
commercial banks in Croatia were concentrated in claims on the government, and
most of these were not tradable ("old foreign currency savings"). For comparison,
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Which was accomplished.17
the Czech Republic had the same ratio for the same year at 6.7 percent, Poland had
26.5 percent, Hungary 25.4 percent, Mexico 20.1 percent, Slovenia 23.6 percent,
USA 12.7 percent, Germany 13.1 percent and Austria 18.8 percent (IMF, 1998).
Most of these countries could trade their public debt freely, which means that one
could "read" its price on the market, as well as estimate the yield for each new issue
of government debt. In Croatia, such market could not start to develop at the end
of 1993 nor in 1994, due to the already described high exposure that the banks had
towards the government. The amount of bank claims on government, which was
twice the amount that could be considered "normal" for a transition country in
1993, was an accumulated expression of the "perverted" nature of the system which
functioned by using bank's depositors' money for government needs, instead of tax
payers' money. It should be emphasized that this system was established during the
period of the so-called self-management socialism, which was not economically and
politically sustainable and thus contributed to its own downfall.
When in July 1996 the first issues of short-term treasury bills
appeared, the interest rates that the Ministry of finance had to accept at auctions
was much higher than the interest rate for loans available abroad. Furthermore,
long-term domestic debt market was practically non-existent, as there was no
demand for it. In such a situation, the only rational solution was to borrow from
abroad and decrease the net debt towards domestic banks . The domestic market17
had structural obstacles which defined the level of interest rates. These structural
obstacles came from the banking sector, and the three most important of them
were:
        a) the already mentioned great initial exposure of banks towards
the government,
        b) inefficiency of banking intermediation (compared to the volume
of transactions, the costs were too large),
        c) a large portion of bad assets in the placements to the private
sector and non-existence of the market for claims on
government.
We shall pay special attention to banks later on. It is obvious
that the monetary transmission mechanism cannot act merely through the public
debt market or exclusively through the deposit and credit market (through the
banking system). Both market segments are parts of an entire financial market.
Both have an impact on each other, and they stimulate or hinder each other's
development. Therefore, the transmission mechanism approach which emphasizes
transmission through the public debt market, can be seen as incomplete. In what
follows, we focus on banks.
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2.2 Examination of the relationship
between financial depth and
the level of development
in transition countries.
One of the main indicators of financial depth, also the best
defined and easiest to measure, is the ratio of commercial bank assets to gross
domestic product. The values of this indicator for transition countries are given in
Table 1. The same ratio was used by Goldsmith (1969) in the first study which
managed to prove the relationship between this ratio and income (GDP per capita).
Later studies confirmed this result (Pagano, 1993). Furthermore, Goldsmith (in
Levine, 1997) demonstrated that in periods of rapid growth the ratio of financial
depth grows faster than income, which was also confirmed by other studies. There
are also studies which demonstrated, through the use of alternative indicators of
financial depth (money, quasi-money and other interest bearing liabilities towards
GDP, as well as credits of the private sector towards GDP), that the initial ratio of
financial depth is a good forecast of income growth in the next three months (King
and Levine 1993). Therefore the study of these ratios represents a crucial analytical
tool for the examination of the relationship between financial and economic
development.
Transition countries in Table 1 are ranked by the main
indicator: the ratio of commercial bank assets to GDP in 1996. The Czech
Republic and The Republic of Slovakia are ranked higher than other countries due
to historical reasons (the high ratio existed at the beginning of the transition).
Croatia, Slovenia, Poland and Hungary follow suit, while other countries have a
significantly lower ratio of financial depth and are at a lower level of development
measured by GDP per capita. The same conclusion is also valid for the ratio of
private sector credits to GDP. Furthermore, almost the same result is valid if
financial depth is measured from the liabilities side, i.e. through ratio of the most
widespread money aggregate M3/GDP. The difference between the advanced group
with Hungary at the last place, can be clearly seen in comparison with the second
group led by Latvia. The M3/GDP indicator of financial depth is greater for
Hungary and Poland than for Slovenia and Croatia. This can be explained by the
peculiarities of Slovenia's and Croatia's "old foreign currency savings", whose
exclusion from the measure of monetary aggregate M3 causes an artificial decrease
in the M3/GDP ratio when compared with other countries. Finally, if we examine
the ratio of the private sector credit to GDP, the countries are again ranked in the
same order as they were when the ratio of bank assets to GDP was examined.
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GDP per capita was also calculated for 1996 based on the data from IMF IFS, February18
1998.
Simple regression results shown in Table 2 confirm the
hypothesis regarding the relationship between financial and overall development
in transition countries. In all the regressions GDP per capita played the role of the
dependent variable . The independent variables are shown in columns with t-test18
results in parenthesis below the parameters.
The constant member was included in the regression because
of a possibility that even with zero ratios of financial depth, income can still be
present. However, in all the regressions it is close to zero, which indicates that in
transition countries income cannot appear without financial intermediation (and
vice-versa): financial development and growth occur simultaneously and in parallel.
The strongest connection exists between economic
development and the ratio of private sector credit to GDP. A one percent increase
in this ratio for any country can be expected to result in a GDP per capita increase
of 92.4$. Influence of other financial ratios is much weaker. If we use a binary
variable (HRVSLO) to remove the mentioned measurement error which arises due
to exclusion of the "old foreign currency savings" in Croatia and Slovenia, the value
of the parameter in the M3 equation is diminished, indicating that inclusion of
Croatia and Slovenia in the sample greatly contributes to the strength of the
relationship between financial depth and development for the whole sample.
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Table 1.
INDICATORS OF THE FINANCIAL DEPTH AND CHARACTER
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Normally, the impact of credit on the private sector is stronger than that of a wide19
monetary aggregate.
Table 2
RESULTS OF INCOME PER CAPITA REGRESSION FOR FINANCIAL
DEPTH INDICATORS FOR 15 TRANSITION COUNTRIES
Constant M3/GDP HRVSLO R  adj. FAssets/ Private/GDP GDP
2
Equation 1 761.98 48.46 0.40 8.75
(0.89) (2.96)
Equation 2 1178.49 92.39 0.37 7.61
(1.50) (2.76)**
Equation 3 986.05 58.71 0.28 5.16
(1.01) (2.27)**
Equation 4 599.79 52.30 4412.26 0.71 14.76
(0.9) (3.05)* (4.21)*
Note: The figures in parentheses below the parameters are the t-test values.
*significance level 1 percent 
** significance level 5 percent.
In the Appendix, the reader can find the same indicators of
financial depth for 66 "non-transition" countries in 1996. Econometric estimates
for these countries. comparable to the estimates for transition countries. are shown
in Table 3. The estimates differ substantially. The first difference occurs at the
substantially positive constant in the first equation. When compared with the other
two this equation confirms that the impact of the overall bank assets is the
smallest. The same result has been obtained for transition countries. However. the
statistically significant constant of USD 4,136 per capita makes no economic
sense, so the estimate can be considered as unreliable (because such a high income
per capita cannot exist without a banking system). The second difference concerns
much higher values (and also higher values of statistical tests) of the parameters
with participation of the private sector credit and M3 in GDP compared to
transition countries. The estimates can be considered reliable because of the t-test
values and because constant members do not substantially differ from zero. The
third difference is reflected in the fact that for this sample the M3 parameter has
a higher value than the private sector credit parameter, while for transition
countries it is the other way round. The fact is that only the third equation
substantially deviates from the results of other research (Levine 1997; see below) .19
It can be assumed therefore that it was this estimate that the problem of omitted
variables affected the most. Another relevant explanation is the one taking into
account the nature of the mechanisms of monetary transmission. In the sample
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If we take into account that credit to government is a substitute to the private sector20
credit from the bank's point of view.
of 66 countries there is a large number of countries with a stable
financial-institutional structure and a stable behavior of money demand. This is
why there is a narrower correlation between the monetary measure of financial
depth and the level of development than in transition countries. This observation
is particularly important because it explains why the parameters that go along with
credits and the monetary aggregate are so substantially lower in transition countries
than in other countries.
Table 3
RESULTS OF INCOME PER CAPITA REGRESSION
FOR FINANCIAL DEPTH INDICATORS FOR 66 COUNTRIES
(WITHOUT TRANSITION COUNTRIES)
Constant M3/BDP R  adj. FAssets/ Private/GDP GDP
2
Equation 1 4135.73 74.79 0.279 24.76(2.14) (4.98)
Equation 2 477.87 207.61 0.448 51.95(0.25) (7.21)
Equation 3 -1444.73 233.70 0.320 30.12(-0.55) (5.49)
Note: The figures in parentheses below the parameters are the t-test values.
* Significance levels are not designated because the sample was large.
With respect to the impact of the private sector credit/GDP ratio
on the level of development in transition countries we can draw the same
conclusion that was made in other similar research that included a much larger
number of countries and a longer period of time (King and Levine, 1993 according
to: Levine, 1997). It follows that credits to the government substantially reduce the
impact of financial deepening on growth  which can be interpreted as a proof of20
superior allocative efficiency in the private sector. It also follows that not much can
be done with monetary expansion alone because the correlation between monetary
measure (M3/GDP) and the income per capita in transition countries is
questionable. A much stronger relation between this measure of financial depth
and the level of development in non-transition countries can be explained with
more developed mechanisms of monetary transmission. Therefore we can
recommend the following to the creators of economic policy in transition countries:
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Positive relation between the rate of inflation and its variability has been empirically21
established. For more on the results for Croatia see: Jurkoviæ (1989), Škegro (1992) and
Šonje (1993 and 1994).
In most of the transition countries it can be expected that the mechanism of direct22
lending to the government plays an important role, because the domestic public debt
markets are not developed enough.
countries can achieve substantial economic growth even with substantial
limitations of national savings and very imperfect mechanisms of monetary
transmission if they manage to relieve their banking systems of the need of
financing fiscal deficit. But the question is - what variables of economic policy affect
financial deepening (development) and the overall economic development? We are
dealing with this question below.
We shall restrain ourselves to a simple regression analysis the
goal of which is to establish principal determinants of financial depth. Financial
depth is measured by the private sector credit/GDP ratio. One of the independent
variables is inflation rate and it is used for indirect testing of McKinnon's
hypothesis of financial repression which forecasts the negative effect of inflation on
financial depth and economic development. If the inflation parameter is negative,
it indicates that the financial repression hypothesis is correct because a high and
variable inflation  causes financial disintermediation in a banking sector.21
The next candidate on the list of independent variables is the
real interest rate. If McKinnon's hypothesis of complementarity is correct, the high
real interest rate should be in positive correlation with financial depth at least in
the case of developing countries. 
The next candidate on the list of explanatory variables is the
share of the central bank's assets in GDP. King and Levine (1993) proved that this
ratio drops with the growth of income and financial depth, so negative value of the
parameter can be expected. We should note here that there could be two causes of
a negative relation. If there is a positive relation between this ratio and inflation, it
indicates that inflation is a mechanism of the transmission of the central bank's
high share into a relatively low ratio of financial depth. In such a case a problem of
collinearity between the inflation and the ratio of the central bank's assets to GDP
can occur. Another transmission mechanism can work through the domestic
public debt market. If this market is relatively big and if the central bank plays a
major role in it, either by operating in an open market or by direct credit to the
government , a collinearity may then appear among the independent variables in22
a regression that would include in its right side both this ratio and the ratio of the
domestic public debt to GDP. In this study. we would expect a negative relation
between the domestic public debt and financial depth. This relation will not be
tested here due to the lack of data.
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The results in Table 4 show that in transition countries only
inflation has (expected) negative impact on financial depth. A real interest rate does
not affect financial depth in any of the estimates presented. The ratio of the central
bank's credit to the government to GDP. i.e. the share of total the central bank
assets in GDP (equations actually differ by these variables) also does not affect the
ratio of financial depth in transition countries. The conclusion on the negative role
of inflation can be considered as quite solid because it cannot be affected by a
variant of specification when other independent variables are included or excluded.
 
Table 4
DETERMINANTS OF FINANCIAL DEPTH
IN 15 TRANSITION COUNTRIES






Equation 1 30.36 -0.45 0.32 7.74(5.47)x (-2.78)xx
Equation 2 32.51 -0.68 -0.36 0.41 0.26 2.67(5.07)x (-2.31)xx (-0.95) (0.51)
Equation 3 22.47 -0.57 -0.34 0.43 0.38 3.82(2.52)xx (-2.54)xx (-1.06) (1.52)
Note: The figures in parentheses below the parameters are the t-test values.
The ratio of private sector credits to GDP is used as a measure of financial depth.
* Annual inflation rate in 1996. Real negative interest rate is calculated as an
arithmetic difference between the average interest rate on deposits (Source:
International Financial Statistics. IMF) and inflation rate in 1996.
** Total the central bank assets.
*** The central bank's credits to the state.
x Significance level 1 percent
xx Significance level 5 percent
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Estimates without a constant made no sense. Expectedly, multicollinearity occurred23
in the estimate in which nominal interest rate accompanies inflation. There were
other significantly bad estimates - the ones where inflation and/or real interest rate
were excluded and only the variables related to the central bank assets were kept.
There is no evidence on such negative correlation between an economic activity and24
inflation that would suggest that deflation is beneficial for growth.
Other variants of estimates have also been tried but they are not
presented here because of the bad results that they have yielded . We can therefore23
conclude that McKinnon's hypothesis of financial repression is obviously correct
as far as the repressive role of inflation is concerned, but we have not found any
evidence that high real interest rates help deepen the financial markets. Although
this estimate should be interpreted with a high level of caution we can safely say
the parameter that goes along with a real negative interest rate is also negative
(although not significantly). This leads us to a detailed analysis of the role of the
negative interest rate in the context of imperfect deposit and credit markets in the
following section.
Although this analysis can be criticized for the size of its sample,
its method of measurement of variables and a problematic specification (many
variables have probably been omitted) that is reflected in low values of the F-test.
the conclusion about the negative value of the parameter that goes along with
inflation is very solid. The negative sign and the statistic significance of the
parameter that goes along with the inflation rate cannot be affected by including or
excluding other variables. Since McKinnon's hypothesis of financial repression is
applicable here, and not Tobin's effect (by means of high and variable inflation), we
can conclude that the best that the creators of economic policy in transition
countries can do is the following:
        a) minimize the pressure on financing of fiscal deficit through the
domestic banking system in order to achieve relatively faster
growth of credits to the private sector,
        b) minimize inflation in the positive values zone,24
        c) create a stable banking system.
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The point here is not that the introduction of an explicit system of deposit insurance25
increases the probability of market failure occurring in the financial system. On the
contrary, the introduction of an explicit and reliable deposit insurance system instead
of an implicit and unreliable insurance through "soft loans", can reduce the risk of
market failure. It should also be kept in mind that deposit insurance is used here as an
example of market failure. If deposits are not insured in any way, it does not mean that
market failure can not occur in a financial system. We still have the problem of the
negative selection of clients whose ex ante quality is unknown. This is known in
economics as a "lemon problem" (Akerlof, 1970). For theoretical elaboration of the
problem in a context of a banking system, see Stiglitz (1985) and Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981).
3
AN OPEN ECONOMY WITH IMPERFECT
DEPOSIT AND CREDIT MARKETS
The above- mentioned work of Ronald McKinnon is the best
way of showing how the results of models change even with the slightest
modification of assumptions. While in a closed developed economy with perfect
deposit and credit markets McKinnon promoted financial liberalization and high
real interest rates, his conclusion for an open developing country with imperfect
deposit and credit markets is unambiguous: government intervention is desirable,
or else banking and currency crises can occur simultaneously (McKinnon and Pill,
1995).
The McKinnon-Pill model describes a situation after a
stabilization during which the financial system was liberalized and market errors
started occurring in it as a result of imperfect distribution of information. Domestic
sources of savings are limited so the share of domestic investments that exceeds the
savings is financed from foreign savings. International creditors are ready to invest
in the government after stabilization and liberalization. because they expect
productivity growth over the long-term. The domestic banking system
intermediates in financial and informational transmission between foreign savings
and domestic investments. 
In conditions of full certainty and perfect information any
borrowing abroad (which creates a deficit in the balance of the current account) is
dynamically optimal. The production growth in the sector of internationally
tradable goods keeps the balance of the current account stable in the long-term.
However, if we eliminate the assumption about perfect information, the real
productivity growth can be lower than it was expected. In the conditions of
imperfect distribution of information, the private sector can have overoptimistic
expectations about productivity growth. An error of the banking system. that can
occur, say, because of deposit insurance , can boost exaggerated optimism in the25
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The conventional wisdom today is that the problems of market failure of a liberalized26
financial system can only be solved with appropriately selected and coordinated
measures in bank monitoring, bank restructuring and financial market development
(Sundararaajan, 1996). Crucial role of supervision of banks in the transition countries
that experienced sudden capital inflow after liberalization has also been recognized
(Ize, 1996). Finally, it should be noted that the negative relation between real interest
rate and financial depth, that has emerged in the regressions in Table 4 can be
interpreted as an indication of how important this analysis is.
private sector. If their deposits are insured, depositors are less sensitive about risky
behavior of banks. Bankers then have an opportunity to enter into riskier projects
and charge higher interest rates. The deposit insurance allows them to behave as
if they expect a growth of productivity after stabilization and liberalization that is
higher than the one really expected. Since the private sector has no means of an
autonomous creation of expectations about productivity growth (banks are
"specialists" for conveying information about economy because of imperfect
information), this sector creates its expectations by observing the behavior of the
banks (looking at interest rates, dynamics of credit expansion etc.). And the
behavior that banks exhibit in the conditions of insured deposits suggests that the
productivity growth will be higher than is really expected. The private sector thus
creates overoptimistic expectations, also borrowing abroad above the optimal level.
When the debts become due, there follows a financial and currency crisis and
recessionary balancing of the country's external position. 
There is nothing irrational in the scenario outlined by
McKinnon and Pill (1995): "It is not irrational being wrong if the error cannot be
discovered on the basis of the information available." (McKinnon and Pill, 1995, p.
17). The exaggerated optimism of the private sector is a result of an imperfect
distribution of information, which, in turn, results in an "anti-Keynesian" situation
where the problem is not in excessive savings, but rather vice-versa - in insufficient
savings, or in exaggerated investments of questionable quality. Such conditions
create space for government intervention if the creators of the economic policy have
different preferences, that is, different expectations (more conservative) about
productivity growth than the private sector does. McKinnon and Pill warn that
closing of the financial account in the balance in the payments is not a solution in
this case, because productivity growth in the sector of internationally tradable goods
can be expected after stabilization and liberalization. In such case, net inflow of
capital from abroad would be a normal thing. For this reason, deficit of the balance
of the current account is justified, the only question here being its share to GDP
and exports and dynamics. The solution should be sought in combining strong
monitoring of banks and taxing capital inflow in a way. For example. the same rate
of legal reserves that is applied to domestic sources of financing could also be
applied to international sources, in order to equalize their relative price.26
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Excessive growth of credit (compared to the growth of GDP) and the fast growth of27
prices frequently indicate deterioration in the quality of the banks' portfolios and a
growing exposure to risks. (IMF, 1996; Haussman and Gavin, 1995).
Finland is unique by the depth and length of its recession. Sundararaajan and Balino28
(1991) and Drees and Pazarabasoglu (1995, according to: IMF, 1996) used an example
of eight countries to show that there was a significant negative correlation between a
bank crisis and real output. The correlation does not necessarily have to be manifested
by recession. Mere significant slowing down of growth may hurt quality of banks'
assets. Some authors believe that the recessionary impact of a banking crisis depends
on financial depth: the bigger it is, the stronger negative impact on real output will the
intensity of crisis create. De Castello Branco, Kammer and Psalida (1996) found a
minor negative impact of the Baltic States banking crises on the real output. The result
is in the line with low values of financial depth indicators shown in this study. In
respect of this, it can be speculated that the depth of recession in Finland can be
explained with the fact that, financially, it is a very developed country.
The appeal to establish strong bank supervision has become
important again in the light of the latest financial and currency-related crises that
have taken place because banks played their intermediary role badly (Russia in
1998). Since the early eighties. around one hundred countries have experienced
some aspect of a banking crisis. It can be seen here that banking crises take place
regardless of the level of development of a country. Also. the depth of the
accompanying recession does not depend on the initial level of development. For
example. in 1991-1993, Finland experienced a cumulative drop of GDP of 14.1
percent, plus the losses resulting from bad loans of the banks in the amount of
around 8 percent of GDP (Koskenkyla, 1995; IMF, 1996). The crisis was preceded
by a period in which annual growth rates of total bank credits moved between very
high 15 percent and 30 percent: "Unlimited growth of credits followed the
deregulation of interest rates and capital flows, which caused strong increase of
losses per credit. This is considered as the main cause of the problem." (Koskenkyla
and Vesala, 1994) . According to Nyberg and Virhiala (1994), generally expansive27
macroeconomic policy and bad bank supervision are also among the causes. The
Finnish experience is so typical that we can consider it representative and relevant
even for transition countries.  In the light of the conclusions from the preceding28
chapter - that the share of private sector credits in GDP is closely correlated to the
level of development - this experience clearly outlines the boundary to which it is
possible to encourage harmonious financial and real growth. This boundary can be
found at that growth rate of private sector credits at which banks can still keep good
control over the quality of their assets. This rate is very hard to evaluate empirically
on macroeconomic level. 
The amount of losses caused by banking crises can be
tremendous. There were many cases where the share of bad loans exceeded 40
percent of the total bank placements (Argentina, Estonia, Chile, Norway, Poland,
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If banking supervision in a country is weak, the information about actual loan losses29
will then remain concealed. However, the problem will emerge on the other side. It
will manifest itself through high interest margin and/or high inflation, the negative
impact of which on financial depth has already been established. In any case, the
difficulties with comparable international measurement of the share of bad assets are
so big, that the estimate used here probably does not affect much the reliability of the
bad asset measure.
Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Russia). Since these cases include numerous transition
countries, it seemed logical to explore the strength of relation between financial
crises and financial depth and indirectly draw conclusions about the impact of
banking crises on the overall economic growth. Banking crisis index was created for
that purpose.
Banking crisis index (BCI) is calculated in two steps. In the first
step, data on the critical period of the crisis are used (see Table 5). The value of the
two digits designating the year in which the critical period finishes is reduced by
five for every year between the end of the critical period and 1998. The figure thus
obtained is then divided by 98. For example. it has been assumed for three
transition countries within a 43-country sample that they still have serious
financial problems. For this reason, this ratio equals one. The value for Belgium,
Netherlands, Germany, Portugal and Singapore, countries which did not have
banking crisis, is thus zero. The value for Israel is 0.194 (=(84-13*5)/98) because
13 years passed between 1983 and 1998. This element calculated in the first step
may be called indicator of relevance of banking crisis.
In the second step, the value of this indicator is multiplied by the
share of bad assets in the total assets in order to correct "relevance" for "depth" of
the crisis, so to reach the value of banking crisis index. Therefore:
(2)  BCI = ((N-5*n)/98)*R  ,
where N is the year that marks the end of the critical period, n is the number of
years between the end of the critical period and the present time, while R is the
percentage share of bad assets in the total assets of a banking system in the
moment of crisis. BCI will be higher with the given R if the crisis is more relevant
(recent), and vice-versa.
For creation of the index, the data from IMF review (1996) were
used and 43 countries were included in the sample (see Table 5). The said review
contains the data on the share of bad assets for the majority of the sample
countries. It was possible to calculate the share for a few other countries on the
basis of the data on the share of bad assets in GDP, while for the remaining
countries this share had to be estimated . The following information has been29
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Significant on 1 percent level of a two-sided t-test.30
used for the estimation: the description of the event (from the IMF review),
information on the level of development (income per capita and the banking sector
assets/GDP ratio), information on recent financial development and information
on the duration of the critical period of the banking crisis. Based on this
information, the estimate of the share of bad assets could have the following values:
        1 for developed countries where information did not indicate any
serious systemic problems recently (Canada, Ireland, Israel,
United Kingdom).
      10 for developed countries or developing countries where
information indicated problems recently (Greece, Japan, New
Zealand, South Africa).
      20 for developing countries where information indicated very
serious problems recently (Jamaica, Swaziland).
The information given in Table 5 is used in the regression
analysis that shows the impact of banking crisis on financial depth, measured by
the share of private sector credits (PSC) in GDP (t-tests are given in parenthesis):
(3)  PSC = 69.721 - 1.549 BCI R  = 0.17 F = 8.392
          (9.76)     (-2.90)30
Table 5
BANKING CRISIS INDEX (BCI) AND THE PRIVATE
SECTOR CREDITS (PSC)/GDP RATIO FOR 43 SAMPLE COUNTRIES
  Critical  First
  period  element
 Bad
 assets/total  BCI  PSC/GDP
 assets (R)
Argentina  1980-95 39.0 0.8 31.8 18.7
Australia 1991-92 6.0 0.6 3.8 77.7
Austria -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 97.0
Belgium -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 66.6
Brazil 1994-98 10.0 1.0 10.0 26.5
Canada* 1983-85 1.0 0.2 0.2 64.8
Chile 1981-83 19.0 0.1 1.6 54.2
Costarica 1994-98 10.0 1.0 10.0 17.6
Cyprus -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 88.6
Dominican Rep. 1992-95 5.0 0.8 4.1 19.0
Denmark 1988-92 9.0 0.6 5.7 32.8
Ecuador 1995-98 10.0 1.0 10.0 28.6
Finland 1991-94 13.0 0.8 9.8 61.1
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France 1991-98 20.0 1.0 20.0 81.5
Germany** -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 104.9
Greece* 1991-95 10.0 0.8 8.2 23.0
Guatemala 1980-90 10.0 0.5 5.1 16.2
Honduras -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.9
Honduras*** 1987-98 23.0 1.0 23.0 22.5
Ireland* 1985 1.0 0.2 0.2 35.7
Israel* 1983-84 1.0 0.1 0.1 72.4
Italy 1990-95 10.0 0.8 8.2 51.8
Japan* 1992-98 10.0 1.0 10.0 183.0
Malaysia 1985-86 32.0 0.3 8.5 74.3
The Netherlands -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 105.6
New Zealand**** na 10.0 5.0 92.1
Philippines 1981-87 19.0 0.3 6.2 48.4
Poland*** 1991-98 38.0 1.0 38.0 19.6
Portugal -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 62.3
Singapore -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 96.0
South Africa 1980-98 10.0 1.0 10.0 137.2
Spain 1977-85 4.3 0.2 0.9 71.2
Sri Lanka**** 1990-93 13.2 0.7 9.2 25.1
UK* 1984-95 1.0 0.8 0.8 122.9
USA 1980-92 4.1 0.6 2.6 65.8
Columbia 1984-85 15.0 0.2 3.1 20.9
Venezuela**** 1994-98 41.0 1.0 41.0 8.4
Jamaica*(xx) 1994-98 20.0 1.0 20.0 28.5
Swaziland* 1995 20.0 0.8 16.3 18.6
Indonesia 1992-98 12.0 1.0 12.0 55.4
Iceland**** 1985-93 3.6 0.7 2.5 48.9
Mexico 1994-98 18.0 1.0 18.0 18.2
Croatia*** 1991-98 20.0 1.0 20.0 29.5
xx The PSC/GDP ratio for Jamaica is for 1995 because data for 1996 were not
available. The data for all other countries are for 1996.
* R (the share of bad assets in the total assets) values were imputed in the last  step
of creation of the index.
** In Germany. financial problems occurred after the unification; however. they were
dealt with as fiscal problems.
*** These are the transition countries in the sample. R for Croatia is the author's
subjective estimate. equal to an average share of bad assets during the 90's. In the
case of Poland. the loans specified in the IMF review as "questionable" were taken
into account when the estimation of bad assets was being made.
*** R for these countries has been estimated on the basis of the data on the fiscal cost
of the consolidation of banking system. For New Zealand, the data on the critical
period were not available. so the imputed values of R were arbitrary divided by 2.
Source: IMF IFS, February 1998 and the author's calculations.
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The share of bad assets in the total assets of a banking system is a measure of31
cumulative error in the allocation of capital. It is called cumulation of error because,
once the bank grants a loan to a bad debtor, it is not easy to stop lending and/or getting
out of lending relationship if the client is important. New loans are thus approved, old
debts are reprogrammed, claims are swapped with shares and other similar operations
are done. The bank thus remains "locked up" in its relation with the bad debtor. This
way, the bad debtor absorbs more of the bank's credit potential and the initial error in
the allocation is cumulated.
This regression remains open for further elaboration and
research. However, it still suggests it is highly probable that there is a negative
impact of banking crisis on financial depth and, indirectly, on the level of economic
growth. To a lesser extent, this high probability follows from the statistical
characteristics of regression; to a larger extent, it follows from the fit of results and
experience in many countries. If we presume that the parameter evaluated here is
stable, we could say that the ongoing banking crisis, which manifests itself in some
country as a 20 percent share of bad assets, actually means 31 percentage points
less of the PSC/GDP ratio. Lost financial depth was lost in an error-cumulating
process within the capital allocation process . This "loss" is turned into a real31
development loss through the parameter of the relation between financial depth
and the level of development. However, it is not possible here to calculate even a
remotely accurate quantitative estimate of this loss. There are indications that it
is large, but further research needs to be done, paying more attention to the quality
and comparability of statistical data.
4
INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION: A FEW INDICATIONS
ON GOOD ECONOMIC POLICY
As mass manifestations of cumulative errors in a capital
allocation process, banking crises can have very high real costs in terms of lost
growth and development. The same goes for inflation, which gives way to financial
disintermediation (McKinnon's hypothesis of financial repression). On the other
hand, economic policy makers should not give up the possibility of short-term
anti-cyclic activities (a Keynesian type of intervention); however, they should keep
in mind that: (a) the efficiency of such activities also depends on whether there is
a financial system which ensures the interest rate transmission of monetary policy;
(b) excessive expansive activities may cause a banking crisis after an excessive credit
expansion during which banks lose control over quality of their assets and enter the
error-cumulating phase within a capital allocation process. It is very hard to
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A bank has to have a source of financing for the provisions for actual and potential32
losses, so higher margins can be expected in such conditions.
imagine an economic model which could indicate an "optimal" combination of
banking regulation, inflation and occasional short-term expansion. It would be very
hard to collect data for such model, particularly the ones about the quality of banks'
assets. Proper processing of such data can take as many as several months and
researchers. 
Still, theoretical analyses and empirical research clearly indicate
that, in a post-stabilization phase typical for transition countries, the "Keynesian"
circumstances characterized by surplus of savings over investments do not
represent a relevant diagnosis of the situation. The system should be observed in
the light of the situation described by McKinnon and Pill (1995). This situation is
characterized by surplus of domestic investments over domestic savings, which is
financed by inflow of capital. Here, the inflow of capital depends on the behavior
of banks, which are "specialists" for processing of economic data. Possible successes
that might come out of expansive policy in such situation are disproportional to the
social developments that could result from excessive credit expansion. The costs
are made because of cumulation of banks' errors in capital allocation. These are
reflected in the share of bad assets in the total assets of banks and in the related
interest rates and interest margins (the difference between lending and deposit
interest rates) .32
The problem of development of a banking system thus becomes
the central issue of the entire economic development. The question of regulating
access to a banking market, operating in it, and exiting from it, is becoming the key
issue. Its solution will decide whether the creators of economic policy will manage
to minimize market error in performing the specialist function of banks. One thing
is certain (the problems that occurred in some Croatian banks in 1998 are the
evidence of it): the search for optimal policy will be neither easy, nor simple. In all
Baltic and post-socialist countries. the transition has turned out to be a very rapid
process of institutional transformation during which a large number of new private
entrepreneurs has emerged in the market in a relatively short period of time (a few
years). A part of them is inexperienced in performing banking operations; the other
part is "dishonest", in terms that their ambitions are limited to using their banks
as "internal" banks for financing projects of small groups of connected persons; only
the third part includes skilled bankers - entrepreneurs, capable of managing other
people's capital reasonably and efficiently. 
The typical situation in all advanced transition countries up to
the mid-nineties was marked by lack of an explicit deposit insurance scheme. Its
non-existence did not mean that the banks could fail. It actually meant an implicit
CROATIAN ECONOMIC SURVEY 2351996 - 1999
The system of limited insurance means a system in which deposits are insured only33
up to a certain amount.
insurance for all deposits. Since government with its taxpayers' money is always
behind such "insurance" scheme, this system meant that the profit from banking
operations is private and losses are public. Such a system cannot be viable in a
democratic country. For this reason, advanced transition countries started
switching to the systems of explicit deposit insurance in the nineties. 
Besides being politically unviable, such a system is also
economically unviable, because it facilitates development of two kinds of market
errors: negative selection and moral hazard. The negative selection and moral
hazard are true enemies of the "specialist" function of the banks in the processing
of economic data. Both negative selection and moral hazard perform distort the
motivation of the bankers. 
Moral hazard is a phenomenon known from the insurance
theory. If insurance premium is too low, the insured person will treat his/her
property more carelessly when it is insured than when it is not. In banking, moral
hazard can manifest itself in the deposit collection process. If deposits are insured,
savers pay less attention to the quality and reputation of the bank in which they
deposit their money. They care more about profit or interest rate. This, in turn,
stimulates banks to compete in offering ever-growing interest rates on deposits. If
this unwanted process emerges, there is also a danger of negative selection. That
is, higher interest rates on deposits require higher interest rates on credits. The best
debtors are those who will stop borrowing from such a banking system, because
they are generally capable of finding alternative sources of financing by emitting
their own securities or by borrowing abroad. When interest rate is higher, potential
debtors come up as loan applicants. On average, they are less likely to be able to
repay the loan. This causes lower quality of assets and accumulation of bad debts.
This problem is even more noticeable in an economic system with undeveloped
auditing and high transaction costs of gathering and processing of data on
enterprises. Such systems do exist in transition countries.
If a system of explicit and limited deposit insurance  is33
introduced instead of a system of implicit insurance of all deposits, it can reduce
the risk of moral hazard and negative selection. However, such a system has to be
very well shaped and incorporated in the complex system of the overall regulation
of the banking system. Garcia and Lindgren (1996, p. 5) underline the irreplaceable
role of strong banking supervision, which functions in a legal environment that
allows closing or reselling of a bank before it becomes insolvent (when actual and
potential losses are higher than the capital and reserves of the bank). If this
condition is not met, then the deposit insurance system will come under a strong
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Even after the payment deadline has been extended to 6 months upon initiation of34
bankruptcy proceedings of a bank, we can still say that the deadline is reasonably
short, but that its further extension would probably affect the credibility of deposit
insurance scheme in the eyes of depositors.
The possibility of rapid growth of savings deposits should partly be searched for in a35
model of implicit insurance of all deposits that was applicable by mid-1997 (no bank
in Croatia has failed before mid 1997).
pressure. Problems in banks will become visible only when they become insolvent.
Thus, if the business operations of insolvent banks become too lengthy, their real
cost will be reflected in higher payments of insured deposits than it would be the
case had the business operations of bad banks been stopped before the insolvency.
The same authors also mention a few more characteristics of a well-shaped
insurance deposit system:
        a) the system has to be explicitly regulated by a special law;
        b) the system has to be compulsory for all who collect savings;
banks themselves should pay premiums; in case an insurance
fund has had significant expenditures, it must be possible to
assess an ex post additional premium to those banks which are
not facing difficulties;
        c) insurance must be valid up to a certain amount of deposit;
        d) in case of insolvency of a deposit insurance fund, the ways of its
additional financing must be known in advance;
        e) payment of insured deposits must be very quick;
        f) premiums must be diversified by risk, if possible;
        g) a premium that would ensure sufficient amount of funds for
covering the expenditures in "normal" circumstances should be
estimated in advance; this premium must be higher in the
countries with a higher concentration in banking system.
Croatian deposit insurance system was introduced in July 1997
and it has fully met the characteristics a), b) and c); it has partially met d) and e) ,34
while it failed to meet f) and g). Quarterly premium of 0.2 percent is linear and it
does not differ banks by levels of risk, which is a substantial shortcoming in the
conditions when there are banks in banking market that clearly differ from each
other by the level of risk. Even bigger shortcoming of the system is the fact that the
amount of premium and the speed of "filling up" of a deposit insurance fund
seriously lag behind the real potential problems in banking that have emerged in
1998. The banks that ended up in troubles in 1998 were the aggressive ones that
had had exceptionally rapid growth (and that had gathered savings exceptionally
fast) in 1996 and 1997 . In the mid-1997, when the deposit insurance system was35
initiated, troubles in those banks could be seen already (Croatian National Bank.
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In mid-1998, the Agency had at its disposal funds that could easily cover in a few36
smaller banks; however, these funds are not even remotely sufficient for covering
insured savings in Glumina Banka (smaller medium-sized bank which was insolvent).
1997), but the possibilities for creating a strong deposit insurance fund  and for36
providing a legal base for strong and rapid interventions in the business operations
of those banks (in order to change their behavior rapidly) were limited. State Agency
for Savings Deposits Insurance, and Bank Rehabilitation Act (Official Gazette No.
44/94) was passed in 1994, in a different economic environment. That act clearly
defined the Agency's sources of funds as insurance premiums, income from
business operations and subsidies from the state budget (Article 3). Insurance
premiums required for creation of a strong insurance fund would be prohibitively
high and would cause undesired large growth of interest margins. The idea has
never been realized for this reason. It was decided that the account of the Agency
would be "filled up" gradually, while the option of rehabilitation was left in reserve
for bigger problems. This option was originally envisaged as a solution of the
problems inherited in four large banks; however, as early as in April 1998, it was
used again in the case of Dubrovaèka Banka.
The bank rehabilitation option can be observed as a model for
management of a serious crisis, when the government is willing to sacrifice
taxpayers' money in order to save a bank. From that bank's depositors' point of
view, this option is an equivalent of 100 percent insurance of deposits. Full
insurance of deposits is not an unknown solution, particularly in crisis situations.
For example, when systemic banking crises broke out in Finland and Sweden in
1992 and Japan and Argentina in 1995, the governments temporarily froze the
limited deposit insurance systems in order to prevent the outflow of capital (Garcia
and Lindgren, 1996). Such moves convert the problems of moral hazard and
negative selection into reality, so 100% insurance schemes are usually applicable
within a short period of time, in which the government prepares a strategy for crisis
resolution.
Croatian rehabilitation option is somewhat more sophisticated
than the option in which all deposits are declared as insured, because it reduces the
risk of moral hazard and negative selection. The thing is - private protagonists in
a market cannot know in advance whether bankruptcy proceedings or a
rehabilitation will be initiated for a bank that has ended up in unbridgeable
difficulties. The central bank estimates the possibility and cost-effectiveness of
rehabilitation and offers a solution to the government. However, besides the
advantage mentioned, this model has numerous shortcomings. First, it is
non-transparent in terms of high degree of discretion that the central bank
administration has in making decisions on the troubled bank. A high-degree
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This is the money of the existing taxpayers, if the government recapitalizes a bank37
with liquid funds in order to solve the problem of solvency and liquidity at the same
time. It would be the money of future taxpayers if the problem of liquidity was solved
and the capital of bank was increased through recapitalization in form of government
bonds, in order to satisfy the prescribed capital adequacy ratio.
discretion generally creates distrust, because it is hard for public to fully understand
and control the decision-making process. Second, this model puts savings
depositors in various banks in a different position. It puts them in a different
position ex-post, after the decision on a bank's fate has been made. Although the
conditions should be the same for all, a large saver loses his deposit in a bank that
the administration has condemned to bankruptcy. However, the same saver keeps
his deposit if the administration decides that rehabilitation should be carried out
instead. Thus, we have a space for intensive lobbying for rehabilitation (which costs
taxpayers more). On the other hand, new systemic errors in allocation of capital are
thus encouraged. Such mistakes can occur if depositors believe that large banks are
too big to go bankrupt and that they will be rehabilitated if they end up in troubles;
also, if they believe that small banks are too small to be saved, so that they will go
bankrupt if they end up in troubles, merely to demonstrate the effect of financial
discipline. If the public has such size-discriminating expectations, market structure
will freeze and healthy pressure of market competition will be reduced
significantly. Third, it is completely illogical that the central bank estimates the
possibility and cost-effectiveness of the rehabilitation. It can provide some data or
an informal opinion, but formally proposing solutions where taxpayers' money is
involved is totally inappropriate. There are two reasons for this. First, the central
bank becomes the first target of lobbyists and media campaigns, which could
substantially affect its reputation and reduce its capability of performing its main
task: keeping stable prices and national currency. Second, the central bank has
reached the position from which it can have significant influence on spending of
taxpayers' money in a rehabilitation process, which means that it has to cooperate
closely with the government and its agencies when preparing its estimates. This
derogates its autonomy. The central bank should use discretion when deciding on
the fate of those banks whose capital adequacy ratio is lower than the prescribed
one, although still positive - because in that case neither the depositors' money nor
the taxpayers' money is directly questioned yet. Only the owner's money is at stake.
However, when net value of a bank becomes negative, the central bank should not
get involved in the final decision on whether the creditors of the failed bank will be
alimented with the money of (current or future)  taxpayers.37
Consequently, overall banks' management system in Croatia,
including the system of limited deposit insurance, is currently being formed.
Croatia is in a transitional phase from a system with implicit 100 percent deposit
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A model similar to the present one could be retained, in which the central bank would38
only have a counseling role in cases of problems in specific banks. Also, any form of
rehabilitation could be discarded and the government should be able to declare
temporary 100 percent insurance of all deposits. At the same time, introduction of
legal provisions allowing the government to make such decisions autonomously or at
the initiative of the central bank should be considered.
Increased premiums and budget transfers are not easy options, because they include39
clearly visible social costs (increase of interest and/or tax burden). However, it is
possible in principle that the purpose of a major share of the existing funds of the
required reserve be changed and transferred to the deposit in the Agency by way of
forming a savings deposit insurance fund (the operation would not have monetary
effects because the Agency has an account in the central bank). This operation would
make risk free deposits (claims from the central bank) risky, because the deposits
would proportionally decrease in the Agency if insured deposits in bankrupt banks
were paid. This means that banks would have to form provisions for these assets. That
would include developing a mechanism for establishing the percentage of reserves
based on the probability of payment of insured deposits, and amend the Agency Act in
such way that it allows this option.
insurance to a system with limited insurance. Many limiting elements of the old
system are still active in this phase. It is hard to anticipate accurately the direction
in which the new system will be developing in near future. It will be determined by
political and economic process in which methods of solving current problems in
some small and medium banks will have a crucial role. Still, a few crucial elements
that future system should incorporate can be specified here:
        a) deposit insurance premium should be diversified by risk; 
        b) the rehabilitation option as we know it should be abolished,
particularly in the part that regulates the main role of the
central bank in estimating possibilities and cost-effectiveness of
rehabilitation, whereas the government should take over the
modalities of crisis management;38
        c) funds that are at Agency's disposal should be substantially
increased by increased premiums, budget transfers or
conversion of other reserve funds;39
        d) wider power of bank regulators should be ensured in phases
when banks with potential problems are still not in the zone of
insolvency (new Banks Act, that is currently undergoing a
parliamentary procedure, deals with most of it).
The importance of a stable banking system can never be
stressed enough. The research in this study has shown a close relation between
financial depth and economic growth. It has also shown that social costs of banking
crises are exceptionally high. These crises should be observed as an evidence of
cumulative errors in allocation of capital. As we could see, these errors can be
significantly increased when, often with good intention, expansive economic
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policies are pursued in order to obtain short-term increase in growth (or in order to
support the growth that has been autonomously stimulated by real factors). There
are clear indications (although not final accurate calculations) that the profit from
a short-term expansive policy is not even remotely comparable to the long-term
costs which become visible later, when cumulative errors in allocation of capital in
expansion phases prevent normal functioning of the system of financial
intermediation. This is why the development of the market for public debt is only
possible in the context of a stable banking system. The development of such
market is possible only when aiming at faster building of a transmission
mechanism that would provide impact on real output through variations of interest
rates is complemented by efforts to build stable banking system at the same time.
Furthermore, the level of economic development can be maximized over the long
term if the country achieves low inflation, develops stable banking system and does
not encumber that very system with a need for permanent financing of fiscal
deficit. This way, major part of savings is allocated to private sector. All
conclusions about banking system are also applicable to non-banking financial
intermediaries, who are not specially analyzed in this study because they are
relatively unimportant at this moment of development. However, transition has
so far turned out to be a very rapid institutional transformation and in a few years
we can expect a different relief of Croatian financial system, where banks will
occupy relatively smaller space and the form of government regulation will be
determined by the experience which is to be acquired in the year or two that are
ahead of us.
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APPENDIX
Table A1
INDICATORS OF THE FINANCIAL DEPTH AND CHARACTER
OF FINANCIAL SECTOR FOR 66 "NON-TRANSITION" COUNTRIES IN 1996
Country / money/Assets*/ M3 / Private**/ Assets***/ GDP/ GDP/GDP GDP GDP GDP M1 M3
Credits**** Quasi
GDP M3
Argentina 28.6 20.8 18.1 10.1 2.8 69.1 15.6 4.8
Australia 91.9 66.4 77.7 10.6 6.1 71.2 5.2 1.5
Austria 173.9 90.4 97.0 13.3 0.4 81.8 6.1 1.1
Belgium 257.8 83.8 66.6 11.8 1.1 79.3 5.8 1.2
Brazil 43.6 27.2 26.5 21.9 3.7 80.7 19.0 3.7
Canada 88.8 61.5 64.8 7.2 3.8 69.1 5.3 1.6
Chile 58.5 40.7 54.2 45.6 12.9 77.7 11.0 2.5
Hong Kong 566.1 175.7 162.1 38.9 0.0 91.7 6.8 0.6
Columbia 30.5 22.5 20.9 12.9 0.8 50.2 8.9 4.4
Costarica 42.6 43.1 17.6 29.9 0.0 78.0 10.5 2.3
Cyprus 155.1 100.3 88.6 33.4 13.8 84.2 6.3 1.0
Denmark 98.6 61.5 32.8 16.8 1.5 47.6 3.1 1.6
Dominican Rep. 28.2 26.5 19.0 6.4 0.7 56.5 8.7 3.8
Equator 38.7 35.3 28.6 15.4 1.0 73.7 10.8 2.8
Finland 93.0 54.5 61.1 9.5 0.3 34.0 2.8 1.8
France 147.5 68.6 81.5 6.7 0.7 66.3 4.3 1.5
Germany 166.5 66.6 104.9 10.8 0.7 62.7 4.0 1.5
Greece 73.1 47.6 23.0 38.8 12.7 69.2 6.8 2.1
Guatemala 23.5 25.3 16.2 1.9 0.7 63.6 10.8 3.9
Honduras 34.6 31.4 22.9 13.2 2.6 59.6 7.9 3.2
Iceland 56.1 37.6 48.9 10.8 2.9 77.2 11.7 2.7
Indonesia 65.2 52.1 55.4 14.8 0.7 81.4 10.3 1.9
Iran 34.1 40.9 17.6 35.6 18.2 51.9 5.1 2.4
Ireland 71.6 55.0 35.7 12.1 0.3 73.9 7.0 1.8
Israel 117.7 84.4 72.4 16.7 4.0 91.8 14.5 1.2
Italy 100.2 59.9 51.8 17.5 9.0 46.0 3.1 1.7
Japan 297.9 112.3 183.0 11.7 6.3 66.5 2.7 0.9
Jordan 145.0 92.2 65.2 61.9 18.1 67.7 3.4 1.1
Kenya 53.2 46.1 28.2 21.9 11.1 66.9 6.6 2.2
Korea 77.7 45.7 61.8 14.0 0.5 77.8 9.9 2.2
Kuwait 111.7 79.0 34.2 12.4 0.4 83.0 7.5 1.3
Laos 21.9 14.3 8.3 14.0 0.2 69.2 22.8 7.0
Lesotho 83.0 35.8 18.1 63.1 4.3 52.2 5.8 2.8
Madagascar 20.1 18.7 9.7 16.1 8.8 28.8 7.5 5.3
Malawi 20.2 17.2 5.8 13.1 2.1 52.6 12.3 5.8
Mali 22.9 24.5 13.2 23.4 5.9 24.1 5.4 4.1
Mauritius 77.6 75.5 44.7 22.7 1.2 83.1 7.8 1.3
Mexico 20.2 27.9 18.2 9.1 0.4 70.9 12.3 3.6
Morocco 69.0 61.9 42.9 20.2 6.0 27.6 2.2 1.6
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Namibia 60.6 43.4 50.5 12.8 6.2 53.6 5.0 2.3
Nepal 36.0 37.7 23.9 24.5 9.9 62.3 7.0 2.7
Netherlands 189.6 85.5 105.6 12.6 0.7 65.7 3.4 1.2
New Zealand 102.0 84.9 92.1 13.9 3.3 58.3 2.8 1.2
Nicaragua 43.4 41.3 28.5 134.3 109.1 77.2 10.6 2.4
Niger 10.7 12.3 4.3 10.1 5.6 27.4 11.2 8.1
Norway 98.5 55.0 72.3 23.4 1.2 29.8 2.6 1.8
Oman 37.3 27.7 26.6 14.1 0.8 69.2 11.7 3.6
Pakistan 46.6 44.9 24.8 19.9 14.0 45.9 0.0 0.0
Panama 270.2 68.4 78.3 37.8 15.8 84.8 9.6 1.5
Paraguay 34.4 29.6 23.1 23.5 5.5 70.9 11.6 3.4
Peru 30.4 22.9 19.1 17.8 0.4 73.8 16.7 4.4
Philippines 79.3 53.8 48.4 25.7 10.9 80.3 9.4 1.9
Portugal 149.5 80.6 62.3 22.8 1.2 63.3 3.4 1.2
Singapore 160.6 84.4 96.0 81.2 0.0 75.8 4.9 1.2
South Africa 160.3 57.7 137.2 7.7 3.0 52.9 3.7 1.7
Spain 134.7 79.1 71.2 21.0 4.2 64.6 3.6 1.3
Sri Lanka 39.1 33.0 25.1 20.8 6.9 69.2 9.8 3.0
Switzerland 281.8 138.1 167.2 19.6 1.4 74.5 2.8 0.7
Tanzania 17.3 21.8 3.1 15.1 7.9 45.3 8.4 4.6
Tunis 72.1 46.6 63.5 11.6 0.5 53.5 4.6 2.1
Turkey 76.5 38.1 23.5 20.8 6.1 83.8 16.2 2.6
UK 129.6 92.0 122.9 7.7 4.0 72.5 4.0 1.1
USA 78.7 59.0 65.8 6.4 5.4 72.5 6.2 1.7
Uruguay 67.0 39.3 28.9 27.4 8.7 83.9 15.9 2.5
Venezuela 20.8 20.9 8.4 36.6 5.9 42.9 8.4 4.8
Zambia 21.3 17.9 8.6 71.8 64.7 62.8 15.0 5.6
Note: Explanations for * can be found in the notes under Table 1.
Source: Author's calculations based on IFS, February 1998, Washington: IMF.
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Table A2
RESULTS OF MONEY DEMAND RESEARCH
- PARTIAL ADJUSTMENT MODEL





y (real output measured by retail sales) 0.4079 0.4112t
(7.009) (7.231)
B  (inflation rate of retail prices – monthly) -0.8245 -0.7543t
(-8.642) (-7.761)
i  (nominal interest rate on time deposits in kuna a vista) -0.00111t
(-1.497)
i  (nominal interest rate on time deposits in kuna) 0.00012t
(1.409)
e (nominal depreciation rate of exchange rate -0.2036t
    HRK/ DEM – monthly) (-1.844)
D (dummy variable – equal to one – in October 1993) -0.1600 -0.1646t
(-3.848) (-4.029)
Tests
R  (adjusted) 0.991 0.9912
Standard error of estimation 0.041 0.040
DW 1.987 1.968
Durbin’s h – test 0.163 -0.355
Notes: Period of estimate: 1993:3 - 1997:3. Dependent variable is real M1 (m) .40
t-values are shown in parentheses below the parameters.
Source: Šonje (1997).
